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Abstract
Background: HCV is a leading cause of liver chronic diseases all over the world. In developed countries the
highest prevalence of infection is reported among intravenous drug users and haemodialysis (HD) patients. The
present report is to identify the pathway of HCV transmission during an outbreak of HCV infection in a privately
run haemodialysis (HD) unit in Italy in 2005.
Methods: Dynamics of the outbreak and infection clinical outcomes were defined through an ambi-directional
cohort study. Molecular epidemiology techniques were used to define the relationships between the viral variants
infecting the patients and confirm the outbreak. Risk analysis and auditing procedures were carried out to define
the transmission pathway(s).
Results: Of the 50 patients treated in the HD unit 5 were already anti-HCV positive and 13 became positive during
the study period (AR = 28.9%). Phylogenic analysis identified that, all the molecularly characterized incident cases
(10 out of 13), were infected with the same viral variant of one of the prevalent cases. The multivariate analysis and
the auditing procedure disclosed a single event of multi-dose vials heparin contamination as the cause of
transmission of the infection in 11 out of the 13 incident cases; 2 additional incident cases occurred possibly as a
result of inappropriate risk management.
Discussion: More than 30% of all HCV infections in developed countries results from poor application of standard
precautions during percutaneous procedures. Comprehensive strategy which included: educational programmes,
periodical auditing on standard precaution, use of single-dose vials whenever possible, prospective surveillance for
blood-borne infections (including a system of prompt notification) and risk assessment/management dedicated
staff are the cornerstone to contain and prevent outbreaks in HD
Conclusions: The outbreak described should serve as a reminder to HD providers that patients undergoing dialysis
are at risk for HCV infection and that HCV may be easily transmitted whenever standard precautions are not strictly
applied.
Background
Hepatitis C virus (HCV) is a blood borne pathogen
which has been recognized to be one of the major
causes of chronic liver disease worldwide [1].
In Italy the highest prevalence of HCV infection
(usually higher than 10%) is reported among intravenous
drug users, subjects who received blood coagulation fac-
tors before 1987, subjects who received blood transfu-
sions or organ transplantation before 1992 and
haemodialysis (HD) patients [2].
HCV is an important cause of morbidity and mortality
in patients with end-stage renal disease [2,3], in fact,
despite the introduction of anti-HCV routine screening
for blood donors and the introduction of erythropoietin
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among HD patients is much higher than in the general
population [2,6]. Nevertheless, recent lines of evidence
indicate that HCV can hardly be transmitted during dia-
lysis procedures when state-of-the-art machines are
used [7]; therefore it has been suggested that the
increased incidence of infections may result from poor
application of standard precautions, such as hand
hygiene, proper use of gloves, and safe injection prac-
tices[8,9].
Between 27 July and 29 September 2005, 13 cases of
newly acquired HCV infection occurred among the 50
end-stage renal disease patients who were cared for in a
privately run HD unit in Lazio Region (central Italy). In
response to this outbreak an epidemiological investiga-
tion was conducted by the National Institute for Infec-
tious Disease “Lazzaro Spallanzani“. The present paper
reports the epidemiological investigation carried out to
confirm the presence of the outbreak, to identify the
source(s) of infection, to elucidate the transmission
pathway(s) and to define the clinical outcome of
infected patients. The report has been written according
to “The ORION statement: guidelines for transparent
reporting of outbreak reports and intervention studies of
nosocomial infection” [10].
Methods
Study design
Retrospective cohort study
To assess potential risk factors associated with the infec-
tion a 33-week retrospective cohort study was con-
ducted. Susceptible subjects were enrolled at the time of
their first HD starting on Monday February 7 2005 and
exited either on Saturday September 24 2005 (end of
follow-up), the last know HD before Saturday Septem-
ber 24 2005 (lost to follow-up) or the day of the first
anti-HCV positivity (incident cases). The date of HD
and relevant patients’ data (i.e.: age, gender, HBsAg sta-
tus and all available data about HCV testing) were
obtained either by the medical director of the unit or
directly from patients’ medical records. A 33-week time
period was considered since it is the time when we
believe transmission most likely occurred. It includes a
24-week time period before the onset first anti-HCV
(we considered the earliest possible contagion date) and
t h ee n do ft h ew e e kb e f o r et h eo n s e to ft h el a s tk n o w n
case (end of outbreak).
Molecular epidemiology
To evaluate the presence of additional cases, to confirm
the anti-HCV status of known incident/prevalent cases
and to assess whether cases were infected with the same
HCV molecular variant(s), all patients who were still
undergoing dialysis in the HD unit on 26 September
2005 were sampled to be tested for anti-HCV and
HCV-RNA. HCV-RNA positive samples were genotyped
and, for samples with the same genotype, a molecular
characterization of 2 different genomic regions (i.e.
NS5B and HVR-1) was performed. Serum was sampled
at the HD unit and sent at the virology unit of “INMI
Lazzaro Spallanzani” to be analyzed by the second week
of October 2005.
Prospective surveillance
All subjects that tested negative for both anti-HCV and
HCV-RNA at the first test (see above) were re-tested at
12 and 24 week to confirm the end of transmission. On
those occasions tests were performed locally and the
results reported as soon as available by the medical
director of the HD unit to the epidemiological team. For
patients who were only occasionally dialyzed in the HD
unit or who moved to another HD centre, information
about anti-HCV status was obtained by contacting
patients’ HD centres staff.
Auditing procedure
Auditing procedure was conducted to reveal potential
inadequacies in the practices of staff at the HD unit
and to define possible transmission pathways. All med-
ical records and HD treatment logs were analyzed.
Application of standard precautions was assessed by
interviewing all HCWs and by reviewing all internal
protocols in use. Moreover infected patients were
interviewed to evaluate the presence of other risk fac-
tors for HCV infection and to obtain additional infor-
mation on the actual implementation of standard
precautions. The HCWs’ anti-HCV status was evalu-
ated through the examination of the compulsory tests
for viral hepatitis done according to the Italian health
regulation [11,12].
Clinical follow-up of incident cases
Between September 2005 and October 2006 all incident
cases were followed-up at the infectious disease unit of
the “Azienda Sanitaria di Latina Ospedale Santa Maria
Goretti“. Patients underwent all the medical treatments
according to their needs and independently from the
present analysis. Relevant data to define clinical out-
come (i.e. ALT level, HCV-RNA and therapy with
PegInterferon alfa-2a) were obtained directly from the
medical director of the unit.
Participants and clinical setting
The HD unit was staffed with 7 doctors and 6 nurses on
duty from Monday to Saturday on 12 HD machines.
Patients were allotted to 4 different shifts, i.e.: Monday,
Wednesday and Friday mornings (MWF-am) or after-
noon (MWF-pm), Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday
morning (TTS-am) or afternoon (TTS-pm).
Case definition
Susceptible subject: a subject anti-HCV negative at his/
her last test before Monday 7 February 2005*.
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HCV positive by Monday 7 February 2005*.
Incident case: a susceptible subject who eventually
became anti-HCV positive.
Possible case: an incident case without sufficient data
to define the HCV molecular variant (i.e. genotype and
characterization of both NS5B and HVR1 sequences)
Confirmed case: an incident case infected with the
same HCV molecular variant of another incident or pre-
valent case (i.e. identical genotype, NS5B and HVR1
sequences).
Index case: a prevalent case infected with the same
HCV molecular variant of another incident case (i.e.
identical genotype, NS5B and HVR1 sequences).
Excluded case: prevalent or incident cases for whom
molecular analysis (either genotype, NS5B or HVR1
sequences) excluded relation with at least another inci-
dent or prevalent case.
*According to the internal infection control protocols,
all patients underwent anti-HCV test at the time of first
HD and then every 3 months (see Results “Audit
procedure”).
Epidemiological and clinical outcomes definition
Standard precautions (which include hand hygiene,
proper use of gloves, and safe injection practices) are
defined according to Health Care Infection Control
Practices Advisory Committee 2007 [8].
Attack rate was calculated as the proportion of inci-
dent cases over susceptible subjects at the end of
outbreak.
Clinical attack rate was calculated as the proportion of
incident cases with ALT > 80 UI/ml at least once after
the first positive anti-HCV test out of the exposed sus-
ceptible subjects at the end of the outbreak.
Clinical outcome: incident cases were classified as
either recovered, if HCV-RNA was undetectable, or
chronically infected, if HCV-RNA was detectable, by the
end of October 2006.
Virological methods
Standard virology (HCV serology and PCR for HCV-RNA)
A third-generation immunoenzymatic assay (Axsym
HCV version 3.0, Abbott Laboratories) was used for
anti-HCV antibody testing. A commercially available
quantitative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay was
used to measure HCV-RNA (Amplicor HCV Monitor
2.0, Roche Diagnostics).
HCV genotype analysis and molecular characterization of
NS5B and HVR-1
A line probe assay (InnoLipa HCV II, Bayer Diagnostics)
was used to genotype HCV in all HCV-RNA positive
subjects. Samples from patients with the same HCV
genotype were eligible for molecular analysis of NS5B
a n dH V R 1 .H C V - R N Aw a se x t r a c t e df r o ms e r u m
samples using the QIAamp Viral RNA kit (QIAGEN,
Hilden, Germany), underwent retrotranscription by ran-
dom hexamer extension and was used to perform mole-
cular analysis. Two-strand direct sequencing was carried
out on nested PCR products obtained from the NS5B
region and from the hypervariable region 1 (HVR1)
encompassing in the E2 gene, as previously reported
[13]. Sequencing was performed on ABI Prism 3100,
using the BigDye Terminator cycle sequencing kit
(Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK). The sequences,
aligned with CLUSTAL W software (version 1.5), were
confronted by BLAST with sequences from the National
Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) database
(U.S. National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov), to confirm the genotype
assignment. Phylogenetic trees were constructed using
the neighbor-joining method, including NS5B and HVR-
1 reference sequences from GenBank, as well as
sequences of genotype 2c obtained from routine Labora-
tory diagnostics or from previously analyzed clusters of
transmission, all epidemiologically unrelated to the
described episode (see figure legend). All the algorithms
used are included in the Mega package (version 2.1).
The results of this analysis were used to confirm a
monophyletic cluster of infection.
Statistical methods
Overall and stratum specific rates with 95% confidence
interval (95% CI) were calculated as cases per 100 dialysis-
week person. Crude and adjusted rate ratios (RR), 95% CI
interval and p-value of dichotomous variables were calcu-
lated according to Poisson regression with a robust error
variance for binary data as described by Zou G. [14]. Dis-
crete variables were assessed with a conventional Poisson
regression. The following were considered as potential risk
factors: age >60, gender, having been dialyzed at least once
either after or along a HCV genotype 2c positive subject,
overall number of HD while anti-HCV negative (as the
only discrete variable), being usually dialysed either on
MWF-am or MWF-pm or TTS-am or TTS-pm or other
(each patient was allocated in one of the 5 above group
according to the shift he/she had 75% or more HD or
“other” if this criterion was not met for any shift). A multi-
variate model was built up including only the risk factors
with a p-value less than 0.10 from the univariate analysis.
Statistical significance was assumed if p < 0.05. The statis-
tical analysis was performed by using STATA 11 statistical
package (Stata-Corp, 4905 Lakeway Drive College Station,
Texas 77845 USA).
Results
Retrospective cohort study
Between 7 February and 24 September 2005, fifty
patients underwent HD in the unit. Data on HBsAg and
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demiological characteristics of the patients are shown in
Table 1. Out of the total 50 patients, 45 were susceptible
subjects and 5 were prevalent cases. By the end of Sep-
tember 2005, 13 of the 45 susceptible subjects became
anti-HCV positive (incident cases), with a crude overall
incidence rate of 1.07 cases per 100 dialysis-week per-
son. Incident cases that occurred by 30 August (10
cases) had also available HCV genotype determination
which showed that all of them were infected with geno-
type 2c HCV (figure 1).
Univariate analysis of retrospective patients’ data gave
strong evidence of association between being an incident
case and being usually dialyzed on MWF-pm shift (p <
0.001; RR 7.79 [2.91 - 20.86]). A lesser degree of
evidence was found between being an incident case and
having been dialysed at least once either along
(p = 0.033; RR = 0.27 [0.08-0.89]) or after (p = 0.090;
RR = 0.27 [0.82-14.53]) a HCV genotype 2c positive
subject. The multivariate model confirmed that only
undergoing HD on MWF-pm shift was independently
associated with being an incident case (p = 0.019; RR
10.00 [1.47-68.02]); in fact, 9 out of the 13 incident
cases used to have HD in this shift (table 2).
On this basis we performed a specific analysis on
MWF-pm shift only. This analysis showed that all the
11 susceptible subjects who underwent HD on 20
April eventually developed HCV infection. Analysis of
data from both shifts performed on 20 April showed
that overall 20 patients underwent HD in this day (9
in the morning and 11 in the afternoon). Among
them was a 81 year old female patient, already known
to be a prevalent case infected with genotype 2c HCV,
who was dialysed in the morning. As reported in her
clinical sheets, she suffered from thrombosis at her
arteriovenous fistula, lost blood and received several
additional doses of heparin. In the subsequent shift,
all the 11 patients who underwent HD (9 as habitual
and 2 as occasional patients) developed a HCV
infection.
Molecular epidemiology
Of the 50 patients dialysed between Monday February 7
and Saturday September 24 2005, forty-three (13 inci-
dent cases, 2 prevalent cases and 28 susceptible subjects)
were still undergoing dialysis in the HD unit by the end
of September 2005 and were sampled. We could not
obtain serum samples for the 7 remaining patients (3
Table 1 Epidemiological feature of the 50 subjects who
underwent dialysis during the 33 weeks considered in
the retrospective analysis.
Characteristics Number
Total 50
Female (%) 14 (28%)
Age (IQR) 63 (47-71)
Median number of dialysis per patient (range) 98 (1-125)
Median dialysis per week (IQR) 2.97 (2.87-3.00)
Anti-HCV positive (%) 5 (9.8%)
HBsAg positive (%) 1 (1.9%)
IQR = inter-quartile rage
Figure 1 Epidemic curve indicating the week when each of 13 incident cases was identified (i.e.: first anti-HCV positive test).I n
particular 7 cases where reported on 27 July, 2 on 3 August, 1 on 30 August, 1 on 8 September 1 on 27 September and 1 on 28 September
(case occurred on 27 and 28 September were reported on the same week). Light grey squares indicate cases who underwent HD in the
afternoon shift of the 20 April 2005. Dark grey squares are for subjects who did not undergo HD in the afternoon shift of the 20 April 2005. Red
lines define a four week periods.
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28 susceptible subjects resulted anti-HCV and/or HCV-
RNA positive. All 13 incident cases and the 2 prevalent
cases sampled were anti-HCV. Genotype analysis was
possible for 10 incident cases and for both prevalent
cases. Three incident cases (possible cases) had inade-
quate viral load (< 615 IU/ml) for genotype analysis. The
genotyping confirmed that 1 prevalent case and 10 inci-
dent cases were infected by a same genotype 2c HCV
while the other prevalent case was infected with an unre-
lated genotype 1b HCV and was not further investigated
(excluded case). The complete characterization of the
HVR-1 and NS5B regions of viral genome was performed
for 8 out of 13 incident cases and for the prevalent case
infected with genotype 2c. Due to low viral load (HCV-
RNA 650 UI/ml and 10,996 UI/ml) 2 incident cases were
characterized for NS5B genomic region only.
As shown in figure 2, results of molecular analysis
confirmed that the HCV genotype 2c prevalent case
(index case) and the 8 incident cases (confirmed cases)
characterized both for N5SB and HVR-1 represented a
significant monophyletic cluster of infection. In addition
the 2 incident cases (possible cases) characterized for
only one genomic region shared an identical N5SB
sequence with the main cluster.
Prospective surveillance
None of the 28 susceptible subjects who were still
undergoing dialysis in the unit by the end of September
2005 resulted anti-HCV or HCV-RNA after 12 and 24
week of follow-up.
We contacted attending doctors of the 4 susceptible
subjects who underwent HD in other centres who con-
firmed that none of them showed evidence of anti-HCV
and/or HCV-RNA in the same time periods. We could
not obtain any data about the genotype of the 3 preva-
lent cases who were not sampled for the molecular epi-
demiology analysis.
Audit procedure
According to the internal infection control protocols, all
patients were scheduled to undergo routine serological
Table 2 Results of the retrospective cohort study for the analysis of risk.
Risk factor Cohort description Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis
Subjects Cases Time at risk
A Rate
B (95%-CI) RR (95%-CI) p-value
C RR (95%-CI) p-value
C
Age > 60 No 16 7 428.86 1.63(0.78-3.42) 0.47 0.121 - -
Yes 29 6 781.71 0.77(0.34-1.71) (0.18-1.22)
female sex No 32 9 869.57 1.03(0.54-1.99) 1.13 0.835 - -
Yes 13 4 341.00 1.17(0.44-3.13) (0.40-3.22)
MWF-am No 36 12 947.00 1.27(0.72-2.23) 0.30 0.218 - -
Yes 9 1 263.57 0.38(0.05-2.69) (0.04-2.04)
MWF-pm No 34 4 939.14 0.43(0.16-1.13) 7.79 < 0.001 10.00 0.019
Yes 11 9 271.43 3.32(1.73-6.37) (2.91-20.86) (1.47-68.02)
TTS-am No 36 12 956.14 1.26(0.71-2.21) 0.31 0.236 - -
Yes 9 1 254.43 0.39(0.06-2.79) (0.05-2.14)
TTS-pm No 34 12 936.29 1.28(0.73-2.26) 0.28 0.202 - -
Yes 11 1 274.28 0.36(0.05-2.59) (0.04-1.96)
Other No 40 12 1063.71 1.13(0.64-1.99) 0.60 0.626 - -
Yes 5 1 146.86 0.68(0.1-4.83) (0.08-4.60)
Dialysis after gen2 HCV+ No 23 2 467.57 0.43(0.11-1.71) 3.46 0.090 1.29 0.658
Yes 22 11 743.00 1.48(0.82-2.67) (0.82-14.53) (0.13-12.65)
Dialysis along gen2 HCV+ No 18 10 578.29 1.73(0.93-3.21) 0.27 0.033 1.70 0.804
Yes 27 3 632.28 0.47(0.15-1.47) (0.08-0.89) (0.16-18.10)
N. of dialysis - - - - - 0.99
D 0.291 - -
(0.97-1.01)
Overa all - 45 13 1210.57 1.07 - - - -
Forty-five susceptible subjects underwent HD throughout the 33 weeks considered, among them 13 became incident cases with and overall crude rate of 1.07
events per 100 dialysis-week/person. First column risk factor analysed, second column descriptive analysis, third column univariate modified Poisson regression
analysis of risk, fourth column multivariate modified Poisson regression. Statistically significant value (p < 0.05) in bold.
A) Time at risk is calculated as week of dialysis person of susceptible subjects; B) the rate is calculated as the number of events per 100 dialysis-week/person;
C) p-value is calculated according to Robust standard error; D) estimate increment of risk for each additional HD shift (measure of association are according
conventional Poisson regression). RR = rate ratio; CI 95% = 95% confidence interval; gen2 HCV + = genotype 2 hepatitis C virus infected subject; MWF-am =
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays morning dialysis shift MWF-pm = Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays afternoon dialysis shift TTS-am = Tuesdays, Thursdays
and Saturdays morning dialysis shift TTS-pm = Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays afternoon dialysis shift.
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Page 5 of 10test for viral hepatitis (i.e.: anti-HCV, anti-HBs, anti-HBc
and HBsAg) and transaminases, at the time of first HD
and then every 3 months. All HCWs should use perso-
nal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves, goggles
and gown depending on the procedure to be done and
they should use new PPEs for each subsequent patient.
The unit was not provided with protocols for risks man-
agement. HD machines were provided with disposable
dialyzer circuits and electronic fail-safe systems. Apart
from HBsAg positive patients, all patients (including
HCV positive ones) were dialyzed in the same room
with common machines.
Doctors’ duties consisted in clinical evaluation of the
patients before starting HD, connecting/disconnecting
patients and assisting them in case of emergency.
Nurses’ duties consisted in taking care of the room,
setting up machines, preparing drugs and looking after
patients’ needs throughout the HD shift. Neither the
doctors nor the nurses were assigned to specific tasks or
patients while on duty; the presence of 2 doctors and 2
nurses was guaranteed on each HD shift. Shifts lasted 6
hours but double-shifts (i.e. 12 h on duty) were frequent
both for nurses and for doctors.
Patients used to undergo dialysis on the same shift;
however shift exchanges between habitual patients and
HD of occasional patients occurred throughout the
period.
The interviews with HCWs (7 doctors and 6 nurses)
confirmed that drugs in multi-dose vials (i.e. 20 ml
heparin vials and 250 ml saline solution vials) were used
in the unit. In particular, it was reported that the
heparin doses to be used in one shift (i.e.: 20 ml syringe
Figure 2 Phylogenetic tree analysis of NS5B and HVR1 region of HCV. The analysis of NS5B was performed for 10 incident cases and the
index case (all genotype 2c). The analysis of HVR1 was possible for 8 incident cases only. Molecular analysis was not performed for 3 incident
cases due to low viral load (< 615 UI/ml). Blue boxes include the viral variants from subjects in the current outbreak; each code refers to only
one subject. Code 00 indicates the index case. Code 02, 04, 07, 09, 10, and 13 are confirmed cases dialysed on 20 April afternoon shift. Code 01
and 05 are confirmed cased who did not undergo dialysis on 20 April. Code 11 and 12 are possible cases (analysis of HVR-1 not available)
dialysed on 20 April afternoon shift. Gray boxes include viral variant from other unrelated outbreaks.
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Page 6 of 10containing 18 ml saline solution and 2 ml heparin) were
prepared by nurses while caring for patients on the
prior shift. Preparation took place in the same room
where the patients were dialyzed with a shared saline
solutions and heparin vial. Neither the saline solution
nor the heparin vials were disposed until exhausted; the
same vials were used both to prepare drugs for the next
shift and to care for patients undergoing HD. Each sal-
ine solution and each heparin vials were enough to pre-
pare a maximum of 13 and 10 doses respectively.
Interviews with patients (9 out 13 incident cases)
revealed low levels of standard precautions. In particular
HCWs made numerous passages from one patient to
another or to a HD machine or a keyboard without
changing gloves or without hand-washing, especially
during busy periods or emergencies.
By the third week of August 2005 incident cases were
spread in various shifts, as a consequence of the deci-
sion of the head of the unit to reserve dedicated HD
machines to HCV patients.
The HCWs’ anti-HCV status was evaluated through
the examination of the compulsory tests for viral hepati-
tis. We analyzed the results of all these tests and found
that all HCWs were regularly tested every year and that
none of them had ever resulted anti-HCV positive the
year before and the year after the event.
Clinical follow-up
ALT determinations during acute infection were avail-
able for all the 13 incident cases. Among them 10 (i.e.:
76.9% [46.2%-95.0%]) showed ALT >80 IU at least once
while 3 never showed elevated ALT. A complete one
year follow-up was possible for 12 out 13 incident cases,
as one subject moved to another city by the end of
October 2005. Of the 12 followed cases, 4 were already
H C V - R N An e g a t i v eb yt h ee n do fJ u n e2 0 0 6w h i l e8
developed chronic infection (i.e.: chronic rate 66.7%
[34.9%-90.1%]). Three of these patients underwent a 24-
week mono-therapy course with PegInterferon alfa-2a
(Pegasys) showing undetectable HCV-RNA levels at the
end of treatment. At the end of follow-up, 7 out 12
patients followed up recovered while 5 developed a
chronic infection with normal ALT levels.
Discussion
The outbreak was suspected on the ground of a pecu-
liarly high incidence of anti-HCV sero-conversion
between July and the September 2005 and eventually
confirmed through the retrospective cohort study and
molecular characterization of HCV molecular variant.
This investigation showed that the 13 incident cases
occurred by the end of September 2005 and for 10 of
them HCV genotype was available in the clinical records
(all genotype 2c). The Poisson regression which included
all the 45 susceptible subjects enrolled in the retrospec-
tive study found that undergoing HD on MWF-pm shift
was the only independent factor associated with the
infection. The subsequent analysis of patients’ flow in
this shift showed that all the 11 susceptible subjects
who underwent HD on 20 April afternoon eventually
became incident cases. Having analyzed the medical
activities reported on the logbook for that day, we found
that a prevalent case (index cases) underwent HD in the
morning; she had several problems with her arterove-
nous fistula, bled and needed several additional doses of
heparin. According to this evidence and the data
obtained from the audit, we hypothesised that the 11
susceptible subjects who underwent HD in the subse-
quent shift were infected through contaminated heparin
doses prepared during the morning by the HCWs who
were simultaneously involved in caring after the index
case and preparing the heparin doses for the next shift.
I ti sp o s s i b l et h a t ,d u r i n gt h ec a r eo ft h ei n d e xc a s e ,
shared 250 ml saline solution(s) and/or shared 20 ml
heparin vial(s) were contaminated by repeated drawings
and injections of materials and then re-used to prepare
the heparin doses for the afternoon shift. It is also possi-
ble that during the bleeding emergency the area where
the heparin doses were prepared was contaminated by
HCWs who failed to change gloves after caring for the
index case.
Of these 11 incident cases 6 were confirmed by the
molecular analysis of both NS5B and HVR-1 viral
region, 2 were proved to be infected with a genotype 2c
HCV with an identical NS5B sequence to the index case
and other confirmed cases while for 3 incident cases we
know they were infected with genotype 2c HCV by data
recovered from their clinical records.
Two additional incident cases did not attended the
20 April HD. We cannot clearly define how these
patients contracted the infection but there is a possibi-
lity they might have been infected as a result of: lacks
of standard precautions, the increased prevalence of
infection occurred after the onset of the first cluster of
infections and the decision of spreading the incident
cases over different shifts instead of cohorting them.
The analysis of NS5B and HVR-1 viral region con-
firmed that both these case were infected with the
same HCV molecular variant of the index cases and all
other confirmed cases.
The end of transmission was defined according the
results of the prospective surveillance which showed no
more incident cases at 12 and 24 weeks after the onset
of the last incident cases. The possibility of HCWs-to-
patient transmission was ruled out since no HCW was
found to be anti-HCV positive. Table 3 reports the esti-
mated overall outcome data according to this
hypothesis.
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Page 7 of 10Several mechanisms such as: reuse of dialysis filters,
internal contamination of HD machines and contamina-
tion of environment, can potentially contribute to
patient-to-patient HCV transmission in HD unit. How-
ever lack of standard precautions, including hand-wash-
ing, proper use of gloves and safe injection practices,
have been recognized as leading causes of HCV out-
break in HD settings [7,8,15-19].
HCV transmission is a majorc o n c e r ni nH Du n i t si n
Italy [2] and other developed countries [8,15,16,18,19].
In fact, the close proximity of patients who require fre-
quent vascular access and high prevalence of chronic
HCV carriers in this population may enhance the
chance of cross-infections when standard precautions
are not strictly applied. Savey et al described a large out-
break of 61 patients in a French HD centre mainly sup-
ported by patient-to-patient transmission via HCWs’
hands [18]. In addition a recent systematic review on
transmission of HCV in healthcare settings in USA
between 1998 and 2008 reported that inappropriate use
on multiple patients of single use vials and failure to
store and prepare medications under aseptic conditions
were responsible for HCV transmission in 15 outbreaks
occurring in nonhospital healthcare settings (6 of which
were HD units)[16]. As a consequence, to prevent trans-
mission of blood borne viruses in HD settings, Centers
for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) recommend
that all single-use injectable medications and solutions
should be dedicated for use on a single patient and
should be entered one at a time only [20].
In a recent paper CDC’s investigators outline one pos-
sible way in which inappropriate use of medication vials
intended for single-person may result in large HCV out-
breaks. Through direct observation they found that
HCWs used to draw medication from a single-use vial
of propofol with a sterile needle. The medication was
injected directly through an intravenous catheter into
the patient’s arm. If a patient required more sedation,
the needle was removed from the syringe and replaced
with a new needle; the new needle with the old syringe
was used to draw more medication. Backflow from the
patient’s intravenous catheter or from needle removal
contaminated the syringe with HCV and subsequently
contaminated the vial [21]. A similar transmission path-
way has been reported by Germain et al [17] and could
have occurred in the present outbreak. An additional
factor that may have contributed to the spreading of the
infection was that medication were not handled, as
recommended [22], in a clean separated area, in fact,
heparin doses were prepared by HCWs, while attending
a HD shift and in the same room where the patients
were dialyzed.
Another important flaw we found in the organization
was that the unit was not provided with any protocol
for risk management nor was a single HCW appointed
to act as risk manager so that, the alert to local health
authority was given only by September 2005, while the
first cases had already occurred by the end of July 2005.
In addition at the onset of the outbreak, incident cases
were allocated in different shifts, a decision likely to
have favoured the occurrence of the 2 additional cases.
With regard to the importance of this latter issue, a
topical Canadian experience in dealing with the recent
lethal Clostridium difficile outbreaks emphasizes that a
comprehensive system of risk management including
dedicated staff and prompt notification of cases was the
single most important factor in containment of ongoing
epidemics and in preventing new ones[23].
Table 3 This table shows the summary outcome at the end of the outbreak
Overall outcomes
Date of detection of first and
last case
27 July 2005 - 29 September 2005
Estimated date of first
infection
20 April 2005
Number of susceptible
subjects
45 (50 patients on HD 5 of whom already anti-HCV positive)
Number of clusters 1 main cluster plus 1 or 2 secondary events
Overall number of cases 13 (8 confirmed 5 possible)
Attack rate 28.9% (13/45)
Clinical attack rate 22.2% (10/45)
Fatalities None
Index case Female 81 with chronic HCV infection and end stage renal disease
Clinical outcome 5 chronic infections (none of whom was treated);
8 recovered (3 received Peg-IFN-2a therapy).
Associated factors Lack in application of standard precautions (i.e. use of shared heparin and saline solution vials and possibly fail in
changing gloves) and lack in risks management.
Lanini et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010, 10:257
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Page 8 of 10Although data is limited, this investigation suggests
that, among end-stage renal disease subjects, HCV acute
infection is not much more severe than acute infection
in the general population, as no patient developed fulmi-
nant hepatitis and the 38.4% (5 out of 13) spontaneous
recovery rate we found was not lower than the rate of
spontaneous viral clearance reported in the general
population[1].
The limitations of this study are that a specific mode
of transmission could not be identified for 2 of the 13
patients. Moreover since HCV-RNA testing was per-
formed only after the onset of the outbreak and the
transaminases were tested only every 3 months, we
could not define the exact time between the infection
and the onset of viremia and/or the liver injury which
would have been precious to further describing the nat-
ural history of HCV infection in subjects with end stage
renal disease. In addition we could not perform a com-
prehensive investigation of the unit, so that the potential
role of the contamination of HD machines and of the
environment was not completely evaluated. Finally
potential misclassification of the 5 possible cases may
have occurred since it cannot be completely ruled out
that these subjects were part of other cluster(s) trigged
by one or more of the three prevalent cases without
molecular characterization. Nevertheless we consider
this latter hypothesis quite unlikely since all possible
cases underwent HD on 20 April afternoon and 2 of
them shared an identical genotype and N5SB with the
other confirmed cases.
Conclusions
Apart from illicit drug addiction, medical procedures are
the most important cause of HCV infection in devel-
oped countries. It has been estimated that in western
countries more than 30% of all HCV infections results
from poor application of standard precaution during
percutaneous procedures [24]. The outbreak described
here should serve as a reminder to HD providers that
patients undergoing dialysis are at risk for HCV infec-
tion and that HCV may be easily transmitted whenever
standard precaution, including safe injection practices
and proper use of gloves are not strictly applied [25].
We believe that a comprehensive strategy including:
educational programmes, periodical auditing on stan-
dard precaution, use of single-dose vials whenever possi-
ble, prospective surveillance for blood-borne infections
(including a system of prompt notification) and risk
assessment/management dedicated staff are the corner-
stone to contain and prevent outbreaks in HD.
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